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What People Look for in Others:
Influences of the Perceiver and
the Perceived on Information Selection
Ellen N. M. De Bruin
Paul A. M. Van Lange
Free University, Amsterdam
This research examines how (a) person information (morality
vs. competence and positive vs. negative information) and (b)
perceiver differences (prosocials vs. proselfs) influence active
(Study 1) and more passive (Study 2) forms of information selec-
tion in impression formation. Consistent with the morality-
importance hypothesis, the majority of participants first
searched for morality information, and overall, participants
assigned more attention and weight to morality information
than to competence information. In line with the negativity-
effect hypothesis, attention for competence information was
decreased more after negative than after positive morality infor-
mation, and negative morality information received more
weight in impressions than did positive morality information.
Finally, in line with the social-value-orientation hypothesis, (a)
a greater number of proselfs than of prosocials searched for addi-
tional competence information after morality information and
(b) proselfs’ impressions were affected more strongly by compe-
tence information and less strongly by morality information
than prosocials’ impressions.
When forming an impression of a person they have
to interact with, people always select information about
that person that they—implicitly or explicitly—think is
informative. They may actively and consciously search
for the type of information about the person they think
they need in a particular situation. For instance, a job
interviewer is likely to search for information indicative
of the interviewee’s abilities; someone who wants to
share a secret is likely to probe for information about the
trustworthiness of the confidant. But even if people do
not consciously or actively search for certain types of
information about somebody, they still give some parts
of the available information more attention and more
weight in their final impression of the person than they
do others.
In the present research, we focused on the way in
which characteristics of the available information about
the perceived, and characteristics of the perceiver, influ-
ence information search, selective attention, and
impression formation in an interaction context. In
doing so, we aimed at extending and complementing
the existing impression formation literature in several
ways. First, as described above, we explicitly assume that
people are selective in their search and attention for cer-
tain types of information. Our focus, in this respect, is on
the two dimensions that have been found to underlie
person impressions—social and intellectual desirability
(Rosenberg, Nelson, & Vivekananthan, 1968; Rosenberg &
Sedlak, 1972) or morality and competence. In contrast,
most impression formation studies do not provide par-
ticipants with the opportunity to actively probe for the
kind of information that they would like to have about
another person—participants simply receive informa-
tion and are asked to form an impression. There are
exceptions, for instance, Skov and Sherman (1986),
Snyder (1984, 1992), or Yzerbyt and Leyens (1991); how-
ever, these studies have not investigated the relative
importance of morality and competence information.
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Second, we contend that via differential search and
attention processes, individual differences between per-
ceivers strongly affect resulting impressions. Although
early theorists (e.g., Bruner, 1957) already acknowl-
edged the way in which people actively or passively oper-
ate on information about their social environment, the
empirical literature regarding perceiver influences on
impression formation is still rather limited.
Third, people do not form person impressions in a
vacuum—they do so for a reason. In most interpersonal
situations, people are dependent on others for some
goal they seek to attain. Impressions of others can be
helpful in deciding what behavior to expect from others
and how to respond to it. This notion of “thinking is for
doing” has received a lot of theoretical attention (cf.
Fiske, 1992), but empirical studies in which participants
actually interact—or anticipate interaction—with the
targets of their impression are still relatively scarce.
Moreover, exceptions, in the form of studies on behav-
ioral confirmation (e.g., Berscheid, Graziano, & Mon-
son, 1976) or outcome dependency (e.g., Erber & Fiske,
1984; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987), are generally not aimed at
investigating the relative importance of morality versus
competence information in interaction situations. In
contrast, we explicitly chose to study impression forma-
tion, based on selection of morality and competence
information, in an interaction situation. However, we
should note at the outset that our current focus is on the
behavioral and cognitive determinants of person
impressions (i.e., information search, selective atten-
tion, and weight in impressions) in an interaction situa-
tion rather than the interaction itself.
In the present research, we employed a mixed-motive
interdependence situation. This is a situation in which
people are dependent on one another and in which they
have the option to choose between pursuing self-interest
or collective interest—a choice people frequently
encounter in everyday life. In this type of situation,
impressions about the other person are especially impor-
tant because they may help predict the other person’s
behavior (or at least reduce uncertainty to a certain
extent) and guide one’s own behavior.
Two studies were conducted: one in which we studied
active information search and one in which we focused
on selective attention and weight in impression forma-
tion. The aims of the current research were threefold.
We aimed at investigating (a) the relative importance of
morality versus competence information, (b) the rela-
tive importance of positive versus negative morality
information, and (c) the importance of individual dif-
ferences in social value orientation (McClintock, 1972;
Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997) in the
selection of information about an interdependent other.
The Importance of Morality
Over Competence Information
The first purpose of our research was to investigate
the relative importance of person information regard-
ing morality and competence. This distinction between
morality and competence information is based on the
dimensions of social and intellectual desirability that
have been shown to underlie person impressions (e.g.,
Rosenberg et al., 1968; Rosenberg & Sedlak, 1972). For
both theoretical and empirical reasons, we predicted
that perceivers generally consider morality information
to be more important than competence information in
terms of predictive utility (cf. Sherman, Judd, & Park,
1989). First, morality information is explicitly interper-
sonal in nature (cf. Peeters & Czapinski’s, 1990, concept
of other-profitability), whereas competence informa-
tion, generally, is not, or at least is less so. This implies
that morality information about a person tells you more
about a person’s interpersonal intentions and, hence,
his or her probable behavior toward you than does com-
petence information. Second, it has been shown empiri-
cally that when people think about others, they give
more attention and weight to morality aspects than to
intelligence or competence aspects (Wojciszke, 1994,
1997; Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998; cf. De Bruin &
Van Lange, 1999a, 1999b). Investigating these processes
in an interaction context is especially important because
explanations for the relative importance of morality
strongly rely on the assumption of interaction and inter-
dependence between people. Thus, we predicted that in
a mixed-motive interdependence situation, people
would find morality information more important than
competence information, resulting in an active search
for morality rather than competence information and,
when both are present, more attention for and weight
assigned to morality rather than competence informa-
tion (morality-importance hypothesis).
The Negativity Effect:
The Strong Impact of Negative
Morality Information
The second purpose was to investigate the relative
importance of negative versus positive morality informa-
tion. There are theoretical and empirical reasons to
expect that the impact of negative morality information
will be very strong and that this will influence further
information search and attention processes. In the
impression formation literature, the negativity effect is a
robust finding. In the domain of morality and social
desirability, negative information receives more atten-
tion and weight in impressions than does positive infor-
mation (e.g., Coovert & Reeder, 1990; Fiske, 1980;
Singh, Onglatco, Sriram, & Tay, 1997; Skowronski &
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Carlston, 1987, 1989; Wojciszke, Brycz, & Borkenau,
1993). Also, a negative impression is more persistent and
less likely to change than a positive impression (e.g.,
Reeder & Coovert, 1986). Indeed, because of the other-
profitable nature of morality information, negative
morality information about a person clearly means that
this person is potentially harmful and dangerous. There-
fore, such information will draw attention (Pratto &
John, 1991) and elicit avoidance rather than approach
behavior (Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; cf. Taylor, 1991).
Two competing hypotheses can be formulated about
the way that negative morality information will affect fur-
ther search and attention for information about a per-
son. According to a first line of reasoning, one could
argue that negative morality information is so threaten-
ing that it mobilizes the perceiver to increase search and
attention for additional information about this danger-
ous person. For example, Pratto and John (1991) found
that negative trait words elicit more attention than do
positive trait words, a phenomenon they termed “auto-
matic vigilance.” Similarly, Taylor (1991) described how
negative experiences and events may lead to, among
other things, enhanced attributional and cognitive
activity.
Therefore, one may predict that negative morality
information would increase search and attention for addi-
tional information (negativity-search hypothesis). Note
that this hypothesis corresponds to Peeters and Czapin-
ski’s (1990) reasoning on the informational negativity
effect, according to which negative stimuli elicit more
cognitive elaboration than do positive stimuli.
According to a second line of reasoning, however, one
could argue that negative morality information provides
the perceiver with an irrefutable conclusion about the
immoral nature of the target person. Because only
immoral persons are expected to do immoral things, the
conclusion that the person is immoral will not easily be
altered or modified (e.g., Reeder & Coovert, 1986). Fol-
lowing this reasoning, it may be argued that it is func-
tional for a perceiver to conclude, immediately after
receiving negative morality information about a person,
that this person is potentially dangerous and to prepare
avoidance reactions instead of further information
search. Hence, an alternative prediction would be that
negative morality information decreases the motivation
to search or pay attention to any additional information
(negativity stop-and-go hypothesis). This second
hypothesis is in agreement with Peeters and Czapinski’s
(1990) reasoning on the affective negativity effect,
according to which negative stimuli elicit avoidance
behavior. Additional support for this hypothesis can be
derived from information-selection studies, in which
people were found to request less information after
receiving negative rather than positive information and
after disconfirming rather than confirming information
(e.g., Beach & Strom, 1989; Devine, Hirt, & Gehrke,
1990; Yzerbyt & Leyens, 1991).
Individual Differences
in Social Value Orientation
The third purpose of the current research is to study
the way in which the perceiver’s personality—more spe-
cifically, his or her social value orientation (McClintock,
1972)—influences information search and attention.
People differ systematically in the weight they assign to
outcomes for themselves and others. Three types of
social value orientations are generally distinguished.
First, prosocials value outcomes for both self and others
positively; they are motivated to strive for the best out-
comes for all persons involved and to minimize the dif-
ferences between outcomes for self and others. Second,
individualists only assign positive value to their own out-
comes, trying to get the best outcomes for themselves.
And finally, competitors assign positive value to their
own outcomes and negative value to others’ outcomes,
seeking to get better outcomes than others. These three
orientations have been found to be relatively stable over
time (Kuhlman, Camac, & Cunha, 1986; Van Lange &
Semin-Goossens, 1998) and predictive of behavior in a
variety of situations (in social dilemma experiments,
e.g., Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975; Liebrand, 1984; Lie-
brand & McClintock, 1988; Van Lange, 1992, but also in
everyday life, e.g., helping behavior, McClintock & Alli-
son, 1989; see Van Lange et al., 1997, for more theorizing
on the construct of social value orientations).
For the present purposes, it is important to note that
people with different social value orientations differ not
only in the levels of cooperative behavior they display
(and expect from others) but also in the way in which
they interpret mixed-motive interdependence situations
(e.g., Kuhlman, Brown, & Teta, 1992; Liebrand, Jansen,
Rijken, & Suhre, 1986; Sattler & Kerr, 1991; Van Lange &
Liebrand, 1991b). Prosocials stress the moral nature of
the dilemma: They consider it good (and, from a collec-
tive viewpoint, rational) to cooperate (i.e., they endorse
collective rationality; cf. Messick & Brewer, 1983). Indi-
vidualists and competitors, on the other hand, view the
dilemma in terms of intelligence, or competence: They
believe that it is intelligent not to cooperate (individual
rationality). Similarly, prosocials interpret the
(non)cooperative behavior of an interdependent other
in terms of morality, whereas individualists and competi-
tors interpret the same behavior in terms of
competence-related attributes, such as intelligence and
strength (e.g., Liebrand et al., 1986; Van Lange & Kuhl-
man, 1994). Accordingly, relative to individualists and
competitors, prosocials tend to assign greater weight to
information about another person’s morality—prosocials
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do not even use intelligence information when morality
information also is available (Van Lange & Kuhlman,
1994). In contrast, individualists and competitors tend
to assign greater weight than prosocials to information
about another person’s intelligence.
These findings add credence to the claim that individ-
ual differences in social value orientations will influence
active information search and selective attention in
impression formation. Specifically, although we antici-
pated that the vast majority of people will consider
morality information more important than competence
information, we predicted that this morality-importance
effect would be more pronounced for prosocials than
for individualists and competitors. Also, we predicted
that individualists and competitors would attend rela-
tively more strongly to competence information than
would prosocials (social-value-orientation hypothesis).
STUDY 1: ACTIVE INFORMATION SEARCH
Study 1 examines active search for morality versus
competence information by people differing in social
value orientation. Participants were paired with a ficti-
tious other person in a social dilemma task, representing
a conflict between one’s own interest and collective
interest, and invited to request personality test informa-
tion about this person. They first had to choose between
morality and competence information; after that, they
had to choose whether they would also like to request the
other type of information.
First, based on the morality-importance hypothesis,
we expected that most people would first request moral-
ity information. Second, on the basis of the negativity-
search hypothesis, we expected that if morality informa-
tion was negative, people would be more inclined to
additionally request competence information because
of enhanced attention and cognitive activity. Alterna-
tively, on the basis of the negativity stop-and-go hypothe-
sis, we expected that people would be less inclined to
additionally request competence information after
negative morality information because of avoidance
reactions elicited by negative morality information.
As for social value orientation, we predicted that the
proportion of participants requesting morality informa-
tion first would be greater for prosocials than for proselfs
and that the proportion of participants who would addi-
tionally request competence information would be
smaller for prosocials than for proselfs (social-value-
orientation hypothesis).
Method
Participants and design. Participants were 139 under-
graduate students (60 male, 79 female) at the Free Uni-
versity of Amsterdam. The design included social value
orientation (prosocial vs. proself) and dimension
(morality vs. competence) and valence (positive vs. nega-
tive) of the information.
Overview. The experiment was run self-paced on per-
sonal computers in individual cubicles. First, we had par-
ticipants sign a confidentiality form. Next, participants’
social value orientations were assessed, after which the
social dilemma task was explained. Participants then
requested at least one and at most two types of informa-
tion (morality and/or competence) about a fictitious
other person they were paired with. It was randomly
determined whether the information they received was
positive or negative. Finally, participants were debriefed
and paid for participation.
Confidentiality form. Before the actual experiment
started, we asked participants to complete a confidenti-
ality form, which was designed to enhance the credibility
of the procedure of providing them with information
about another person (see Vonk, 1998, for a similar pro-
cedure). The form first inquired whether the participant
had participated in a personality study last week (all par-
ticipants correctly answered that they had not). The
form then stated that in this study, participants would
receive information about a person who had partici-
pated in the aforementioned personality study but that
this information could only be given if the participant
declared to handle this information with confidentiality
and not to discuss the information with anyone. If they
did not want to sign the form, it was stated, they could
participate in an other, unrelated experiment in which
no person information was given. All participants signed
the confidentiality form.
Assessment of social value orientations. Participants’
social value orientations were assessed by means of nine
decomposed games, each involving a choice between a
prosocial, an individualistic, and a competitive option.
Consistent with prior research, people were classified as
prosocials, individualists, or competitors if they made at
least six out of nine choices consistent with one of these
orientations (the decomposed games procedure is dis-
cussed in more detail by Van Lange et al., 1997). We iden-
tified 73 prosocials, 31 individualists, and 12 competi-
tors. Twenty-three participants made fewer than six
consistent choices and, hence, could not be classified.
Participants were collapsed across individualists and
competitors, which resulted in 73 prosocials (33 men, 40
women) and 43 proselfs (19 men, 24 women).1
The decision-making task. The mixed-motive interde-
pendence situation was presented to participants in the
form of a decision-making task. Participants were told
that they were paired with another participant who was
in a different computer room. The decision-making task
was adopted from prior research (Van Lange & Kuhl-
man, 1994; Van Lange & Liebrand, 1991a, 1991b).
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Participants were told that the person with whom they
were paired would have four yellow points, each of which
was worth 5 Dutch guilders to him or her but worth 10
Dutch guilders to the participant. They were told further
that they themselves would have four blue points, each
worth 5 Dutch guilders to the participant but worth 10
Dutch guilders to the other person. Instructions stated
that although the points represented money, the study
would not involve additional monetary payoffs; however,
participants were asked to act as if the points represented
real money. They also were told that they would receive
information about the amount of money they them-
selves and the other person would have won or lost at the
end of the study.
Participants were told that their task was to decide
how many points—none, one, two, three, or four—they
would give to the other person. They also were led to
believe that the other person would decide how many
points he or she would give to them. It was stressed that
every point transferred results in a 5-guilder loss for the
giver and a 10-guilder gain for the receiver. After a few
calculation examples, participants were provided with a
table containing the 5 × 5 payoff matrix for the task, dis-
playing the outcomes for both themselves and the other
person for all possible combinations of own and other’s
choices, that they could consult throughout the experi-
ment. In addition, an eight-item questionnaire to check
participants’ comprehension of the task was adminis-
tered, the results of which showed that the participants
comprehended the task structure. Of the participants,
99% made no mistakes (118 participants) or only one
mistake (19 participants). Only 1 participant made two
mistakes; there were no participants who made more
than two mistakes.
Manipulation of morality and competence information.
Participants were told that the study was, among other
things, concerned with the influence of information
about the other person on the way in which people make
decisions. They were told that they were in the condition
in which they would receive information about the per-
son they would be paired with in order to form an
impression of this person and that this person would not
receive any information about the participant. Partici-
pants were told that to some extent they could choose
what kind of information they wanted to have about the
other person. The information about the other person
came, so we told them, from a personality test that the
person had completed the past week. Participants were
told that the other person had not yet read his or her test
report because it was not ready but that he or she had
consented to the anonymous use of the test information
in this study and that the information they would receive
consisted of parts of the provisional test report.
Participants were told that they could choose from
two types of information about the other person: infor-
mation about the morality score or the competence
score of the person on the personality test. Participants
could mouse-click a button on the computer screen to
request either morality information or competence
information. We systematically varied the order in which
the two types of information were mentioned as well as
whether the morality information button or the compe-
tence information button was at the left of the computer
screen. This variation did not affect results.
Participants were told that it would be possible, but
not obligatory, also to request the other type of informa-
tion later. Because we were looking for differences
between conditions in the proportion of participants
that requested certain types of information, we had to
make this request costly to some extent to prevent that all
participants would simply request all information about
the person with whom they were paired. This was accom-
plished by telling the participant that the provisional test
reports had to be downloaded from another specially
protected computer network and that this would take
some time. It actually took 2 minutes, during the first 110
seconds of which a text on the computer screen stated
that the requested information was being downloaded
and that the participant should wait patiently and not
start doing something else that would divert his or her
attention. During the last 10 seconds, this text was
replaced by a text stating that the information was now
coming in. After that, the requested test information
appeared on the screen and the name of the fictitious
other person was replaced by an “X.” The morality and
competence information was equally extreme in evalua-
tion terms. Whether the information was positive or
negative was randomly determined. The four different
types of information are listed in the appendix.
When they were finished reading the information,
participants were asked whether they also wanted to
request the other type of information—morality infor-
mation if they had just requested competence informa-
tion and competence information if they had just
requested morality information—or whether they
wanted to start on the decision-making task. It was
stressed that the downloading of the information would
again take some time. Again, participants could indicate
their choice by mouse-clicking a button on the computer
screen. Finally, participants actually engaged in the
decision-making task with the fictitious other person
(i.e., indicated how many points they would give and
how many points they expected the other person to
give), after which they were debriefed and paid for
participation.
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Results
As predicted by the morality-importance hypothesis, a
substantial majority of 117 out of 139 participants
(84.2%) requested morality information first: A signifi-
cant deviation from 50 percent, χ2(1) = 63.57, p < .0001.
The social-value-orientation hypothesis, predicting that
this effect would be more pronounced for prosocials
than for proselfs, was not confirmed, although the pro-
portions followed the predicted pattern. Among proso-
cials, 63 out of 73 (86.3%) requested morality informa-
tion first, and among proselfs, 33 out of 43 (76.7%)
requested morality information first, but these propor-
tions were not significantly different, χ2(1) = 1.73, ns.
Next, we conducted a 2 (valence of morality informa-
tion: positive vs. negative) × 2 (social value orientation:
prosocial vs. proself) × 2 (request for additional informa-
tion: yes vs. no) log-linear analysis for the large group of
participants who had requested morality information
first (N = 117). This analysis revealed a significant inter-
action between social value orientation and request of
additional information, partial χ2(1) = 4.94, p < .05. As
predicted by the social-value-orientation hypothesis,
proselfs (63.6%, 21 out of 33) were more likely to request
additional competence information than were proso-
cials (39.7%, 25 out of 63). The only other effect
revealed by the log-linear analysis for the morality-first
group was a main effect for social value orientation, par-
tial χ2(1) = 9.53, p < .005, showing that the number of
prosocials in this group was significantly larger than the
number of proselfs (63 vs. 33 participants). It is interest-
ing to note that in the group that requested competence
information first, there were equal numbers of proso-
cials and proselfs (i.e., 10 of each). However, these num-
bers may be too small for definitive conclusions to be
drawn.
Neither of our negativity-effect hypotheses received
support: Relative to positive morality information, nega-
tive morality information neither increased nor
decreased the likelihood for participants to request
additional information.
DISCUSSION
Study 1 tested three hypotheses. First, the results of
Study 1 provide strong support for the morality-
importance hypothesis. As predicted, the vast majority of
participants chose morality information first.
Second, neither the negativity-search hypothesis nor
the negativity stop-and-go hypothesis received support:
The valence of first-requested morality information did
not increase or decrease motivation to request addi-
tional competence information. In retrospect, it is con-
ceivable that both the low informational value of positive
morality information and the mobilizing nature of nega-
tive morality information induced motives to search for
additional information and that these conflicting
motives cancelled each other out, thus resulting in a null
effect. Also, it is possible that our measure of informa-
tion search—the possibility to request only one other
type of information—was not sensitive enough to detect
any differences. For example, in Yzerbyt and Leyens’s
(1991) studies, participants could request up to 10
pieces of information, whereas in our study, the maxi-
mum was 2. Finally, it may have been the case that for
some people, the negative morality information may
have been very extreme, whereas others may have con-
sidered it rather moderate. It may be the case that
extremely negative information would lead to affective
avoidance reactions, supporting the negativity stop-
and-go hypothesis, whereas moderately negative infor-
mation would lead to cognitive elaboration, supporting
the negativity-search hypothesis (cf. Peeters & Czapinski,
1990). The extremity of negative information, as well as
individual differences in sensitivity to this extremity,
would be interesting topics for future research.
Third, the social-value-orientation hypothesis
received partial support. We failed to find support for
the prediction that prosocials would be more strongly
inclined than proselfs to actively search for morality
information. However, this may have been due to a ceil-
ing effect: Five out of every six participants requested
morality information first (see Note 4). Furthermore,
we did find support for the hypothesis that more pro-
selfs than prosocials requested additional competence
information after having first requested morality
information.
STUDY 2: ATTENTION AND WEIGHT
In a second study, we aimed at extending Study 1 in
multiple ways. First, in Study 1, we investigated the active
search for information about a person with whom one is
interdependent. However, we did not investigate atten-
tion paid to different kinds of incoming information.
Also, even more important, we did not investigate the
weight different people give to different kinds of infor-
mation in their resulting impression. In Study 2, we
addressed these issues, focusing on selective attention
and weight in impression formation. In this study, we
provided participants with both morality and compe-
tence information—in that order, based on the results of
Study 1. Again, we systematically varied whether the
information was positive or negative. Dependent vari-
ables were (a) reading times for both morality and com-
petence information as a measure of attention and (b)
global impressions, which would reflect the relative
weight given to morality and competence information in
impression formation.
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For reading times, we advanced the following
hypotheses. First, based on the morality-importance
hypothesis as well as on a primacy effect, we expected
reading times to be longer for morality information than
for competence information. Second, based on the
negativity-effect hypothesis, we expected reading times
to be longer for negative than for positive morality infor-
mation. Furthermore, we again advanced two compet-
ing hypotheses regarding the effect of negative morality
information on further attention processes. First, it may
be expected that negative morality information would
elicit longer reading times for the subsequent compe-
tence information than would positive morality informa-
tion because of enhanced attention and cognitive activ-
ity (negativity-search hypothesis). Alternatively, negative
morality information may elicit shorter reading times for
the subsequent competence information than positive
morality information because negative morality infor-
mation would elicit avoidance reactions (negativity
stop-and-go hypothesis).
As for impressions, we predicted that these would be
more strongly influenced by morality information than
by competence information (morality-importance
hypothesis). Furthermore, we assumed that the impact
of negative morality information would be stronger than
the impact of positive morality information. Accord-
ingly, we predicted that the valence of the subsequent
competence information would exhibit a stronger effect
on impressions when the morality information was posi-
tive than when the morality information was negative
(negativity-effect hypothesis). Finally, we predicted that
effects of morality information would be stronger for
prosocials than for proselfs and that competence effects
would be stronger for proselfs than for prosocials
(social-value-orientation hypothesis).
Method
Participants and design. Participants were 117 under-
graduate students (32 men, 85 women) at the Free Uni-
versity of Amsterdam. The design included social value
orientation (prosocial vs. proself), valence of morality
information (positive vs. negative), and valence of com-
petence information (positive vs. negative) as between-
participant factors.
Overview. The experiment was run self-paced on per-
sonal computers in individual cubicles. First, partici-
pants’ social value orientation was assessed. Next, the
social dilemma task was explained. Participants first
received positive or negative morality information and
then (equally extreme) positive or negative competence
information about the fictitious person with whom they
were paired. They engaged in the task with this person
and rated their impression of the other person. Finally,
participants were debriefed and paid for participation.
Procedure. As in Study 1, participants first all voluntar-
ily signed a confidentiality form. Again, social value ori-
entation was assessed by means of nine decomposed
games (see Study 1). We identified 50 prosocials, 26 indi-
vidualists, and 25 competitors. Sixteen participants
could not be classified (i.e., made fewer than six consis-
tent choices). Collapsed across individualists and com-
petitors, this distribution resulted in 50 prosocials (17
men, 33 women) and 51 proselfs (14 men, 37 women).2
The same decision-making task was used as in Study 1.
However, we decided to make the task more involving by
holding out the prospect of real additional monetary
payoffs. Therefore, this time, instructions stated that the
points represented real additional monetary payoffs. To
provide reasonable additions to the 15 Dutch guilders
they were told they would receive for participation, in
this study, every point was worth 50 or 100 cents so that
participants could at most earn an additional 6 Dutch
guilders (on top of the promised 15 Dutch guilders).
Again, all participants comprehended the task structure:
Only 16 participants erred one out of eight comprehen-
sion questions; all other 101 participants made no
mistakes.
The cover story was also the same as in Study
1—except, of course, that this study did not involve
information search. Participants were randomly
assigned to either the positive or the negative morality
information condition and to either the positive or the
negative competence information condition. They were
told that they would receive two types of information
about the other person: Information about the person’s
morality score on the personality test or information
about the person’s competence score.3 In comparison to
Study 1, the competence information was modified
slightly to obtain a manipulation that seemed somewhat
more relevant to the present interaction setting (see the
appendix).
Based on the results of Study 1, all participants first
received morality information. They read this informa-
tion at their own pace and mouse-clicked a “go on” but-
ton on the computer screen once they were finished
reading. Next, they received competence information,
which they also read at their own pace, again mouse-
clicking a “go on” button on the computer screen once
they were finished reading. Then the decision-making
task was recapitulated and the participants were asked to
wait a couple of moments in which the computer was
connected to the computer of the person with whom
they would be paired. It was stressed that directly after
the task, consisting of one round of decision making, the
computer would calculate and display the amount of
money that both the participant and the other person
would receive. After this, participants actually engaged
in the task with the fictitious other person and (before
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any feedback about the target’s behavior) indicated how
positive or negative their general impression of the other
person was (–3 = very negative, 3 = very positive).4
At the end of the experiment, all participants were
fully debriefed and received 20 Dutch guilders, instead
of the appointed 15 Dutch guilders, for their participa-
tion. (This was the amount they would have got if the
other person had been maximally cooperative, that is, if
he or she had given four points, and if they themselves
had been moderately cooperative, that is, if the partici-
pant had given two points.)
Results
Reading times. Reading times were first inspected for
outliers. One participant had a z score larger than three
for morality information reading time, four participants
had z scores larger than three for the competence infor-
mation reading time, and one participant had z scores
larger than three for the reading times of both types of
information. These six participants, all from different
conditions, were excluded from the analyses. The read-
ing times were logarithmically transformed and then
subjected to a 2 (valence of morality information: posi-
tive vs. negative) × 2 (valence of competence informa-
tion: positive vs. negative) × 2 (social value orientation:
prosocial vs. proself) × 2 (dimension: morality informa-
tion vs. competence information) analysis of variance,
with dimension as a within-participant variable—the
other variables being between participants. (For inter-
pretational purposes, the means reported below are
untransformed.)
Relevant to the morality-importance hypothesis, the
analysis produced the predicted main effect for dimen-
sion, F(1, 88) = 51.29, p < .001. Overall, participants spent
more time reading morality information than compe-
tence information (M = 19.91 vs. M = 14.48 seconds),
suggesting that morality information was more impor-
tant to them than was competence information. (It
should be noted, however, that strictly spoken, the
morality-importance hypothesis was not tested directly
in this study. Because morality information was always
presented first, a primacy effect may at least partly
account for this result.)
Relevant to the negativity-effect hypothesis, the
dimension main effect was qualified by an interaction
with valence of morality information, F(1, 88) = 6.62, p <
.05. Participants always spent more time reading moral-
ity information than competence information, both
when the morality information was negative (M = 20.99
vs. M = 13.74 seconds) and when it was positive (M =
18.78 vs. M = 15.26 seconds) (see Figure 1). However, this
difference was more pronounced when the morality
information was negative rather than positive (mean dif-
ferences of 7.25 and 3.52 seconds, respectively). So, after
negative morality information, interest in competence
information decreased more than after positive compe-
tence information. This is in line with the negativity
stop-and-go hypothesis.5
Impressions. Impressions were subjected to a 2
(valence of morality information: positive vs. negative) ×
2 (valence of competence information: positive vs. nega-
tive) × 2 (social value orientation: prosocial vs. proself)
analysis of variance. This analysis produced main effects
for valence of both morality information, F(1, 93) =
192.02, p < .001, and competence information, F(1, 93) =
13.86, p < .001, qualified by an interaction of these two
variables, F(1, 93) = 4.05, p < .05.6 Overall, participants
expressed more favorable impressions when the moral-
ity information was positive rather than negative (M =
1.39 vs. M = –1.33) and when the competence informa-
tion was positive rather than negative (M = 0.30 vs. M =
–0.35). As predicted by the morality-importance
hypothesis, the effect of morality information (a mean
difference of 2.71, effect size d = 2.40) was much more
pronounced than the competence effect (a mean differ-
ence of 0.66, effect size d = 0.37), meaning that morality
information received more weight in impressions than
did competence information.
Relevant to the negativity-effect hypothesis, the inter-
action between morality and competence information
showed that competent target persons only elicited
more favorable impressions than incompetent targets
when the morality information was positive (M = 1.85 vs.
M = 0.87, p < .05, Tukey’s post hoc contrast test) but not
when it was negative (M = –1.19 vs. M = –1.48, ns). This is
consistent with the negativity stop-and-go hypothesis:
Negative morality information is given so much weight
that in its presence, competence information hardly
affected impressions.
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Figure 1 Average reading times (in seconds) for morality and compe-
tence information as a function of the valence of morality in-
formation.
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Relevant to the social-value-orientation hypothesis,
the two-way interaction between the valence of morality
information and the valence of competence informa-
tion was further qualified by a three-way interaction
including social value orientation, F(1, 93) = 11.55, p <
.01. The relevant means are displayed in Table 1. As can
be seen, prosocials’ impressions of moral targets were
always more favorable than their impressions of immoral
targets (first vs. third and second vs. fourth columns).
However, prosocials did not differ in their impressions of
competent and incompetent targets, regardless of
whether they were described by positive morality infor-
mation (first vs. second column) or by negative morality
information (third vs. fourth column). So, in line with
the social-value-orientation hypothesis, impressions of
prosocials were only affected by morality information
and not by competence information. For proselfs, the
valence of the competence information did affect
impressions except—in line with the negativity-effect
hypothesis—when morality information was positive
(first vs. second column), not when it was negative (third
vs. fourth column). Moreover, for proselfs, the valence of
the morality information affected impressions only
when competence information was positive (first vs.
third column) and not when it was negative (second vs.
fourth column). In sum, consistent with the social-value-
orientation hypothesis, proselfs assigned less weight to
morality information and more weight to competence
information than did prosocials.
Discussion
First, as in Study 1, the morality-importance hypothe-
sis received strong support: More attention (longer read-
ing times) was paid to morality information than to com-
petence information, and morality information received
greater weight in impressions than did competence
information.
Second, the negativity-effect hypothesis also received
some support. First, the difference in reading times
between morality and competence information was
more pronounced when the morality information was
negative than when it was positive. This is in line with the
negativity stop-and-go hypothesis: Negative morality
information decreases motivation to pay attention to
additional information. A similar result was found for
impressions: In the presence of negative morality infor-
mation, competence information did not influence
impressions, whereas it did when the morality informa-
tion was positive. Negative morality information thus
received more weight in impressions than did positive
morality information.
Third, the social-value-orientation hypothesis also
received support. Prosocials’ impressions were affected
only by morality information, whereas proselfs’ impres-
sions also were affected by competence information and
morality information affected proselfs’ impressions to a
lesser extent than did prosocials’ impressions. Thus, pro-
socials assigned more weight to morality information
and less weight to competence information than did
proselfs.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present research investigated influences of the
perceiver and the perceived on information search and
selective attention in impression formation. In two
experiments, we found support for three sets of hypothe-
ses regarding (a) the overall importance of morality over
competence information (morality-importance
hypothesis), (b) the impact of negative morality infor-
mation on further information search and attention
(negativity-effect hypothesis), and (c) the influence of
individual differences in social value orientation in
search and attention processes (social-value-orientation
hypothesis).
The Importance of
Morality Information
The first purpose of the present research was to inves-
tigate the relative importance of morality versus compe-
tence information in impression formation in an inter-
action context. Relevant to this goal, we found that the
morality-importance hypothesis received strong sup-
port. Most people first look for morality rather than com-
petence information about an interdependent other
(Study 1). Furthermore, people pay more attention to
morality information than to competence information
about an interdependent other, as reflected in reading
times, and assign more weight to morality than to com-
petence information when forming an impression of
this person (Study 2). Because we decided to present
morality information first in Study 2, the morality-
importance effect in that study was confounded with a
primacy effect. However, the morality-importance phe-
nomenon has received ample support in both our own
work (the present Study 1; De Bruin & Van Lange, 1999a,
1999b) and others’ work (e.g., Wojciszke et al., 1998).
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TABLE 1: Impressions of the Four Different Target Types by Pro-
socials and Proselfs
Target Information
Moral and Moral and Immoral and Immoral and
Competent Incompetent Competent Incompetent
Prosocials 1.88c 1.69c –0.83a, b –1.59a
Proselfs 1.83c –0.20b –1.47a –1.25a, b
NOTE: Means that do not share subscripts differ at p < .05 (Tukey’s post
hoc contrast test).
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Unlike the majority of impression formation studies,
in which the perceiver is like a one-way-mirror observer,
the present research demonstrated the morality-
importance effect in an interaction context. This is all
the more important because the explanation for this
effect generally assumes interaction between people.
Morality-related characteristics are assumed to affect
other people than the person who possesses them (cf.
Peeters & Czapinski’s, 1990, concept of other-
profitability). However, to affect another person, there
must be some form of interaction between people. It has
been demonstrated (e.g., Wojciszke et al., 1998) that
morality characteristics are also more influential than
competence characteristics in abstract person impres-
sions, that is, not studied in an interaction context. In
our view, this abstract morality-importance effect could
well be the result of repeated experience with the impor-
tance of morality information in actual interactions. If
one interprets a global person impression as a way to
locate a person on an approach-avoidance dimension
(Wojciszke et al., 1998) or a cooperative-competitive
dimension (cf. De Bruin & Van Lange, 1999a, 1999b), it
makes sense that morality information has such a large
impact on global person impressions.
The Impact of Negative
Morality Information
Our second purpose was to investigate the relative
importance of negative versus positive morality informa-
tion in impression formation in an interaction context.
We found that the negativity-effect hypothesis received
partial support. In Study 1, negative morality informa-
tion neither increased nor decreased the motivation to
search for additional information. However, in Study 2,
attention to subsequent competence information
decreased more after negative morality information
than after positive morality information, and in the pres-
ence of negative morality information, competence
information did not influence impressions anymore.
This discrepancy between the findings of Studies 1 and 2
can be resolved by concluding that active information
search and more passive attention to incoming informa-
tion are very different processes that cannot readily be
generalized to one another. Alternatively, it is possible
that our measure of information search was not sensitive
enough in that the number of items that can be requested
should be much larger than two before differences can be
detected (cf. Yzerbyt & Leyens, 1991).
The Study 2 findings support what we have called the
negativity stop-and-go hypothesis: Rather than mobiliz-
ing a person to search for more information about a dan-
gerous interdependent other, negative morality infor-
mation provides a person with an irrefutable conclusion
about the other that decreases the need to pay attention
to additional information. Thus, these findings provide
an explanation for studies (e.g., Reeder & Coovert,
1986) showing that impressions based on negative
morality information are very resistant to change. This
may be the case because people simply do not pay
enough attention to information that might refute such
an impression.
However, we should note it cannot be unequivocally
concluded from the present research that negative
morality information decreases motivation to pay atten-
tion to any additional information. It is possible that only
the motivation to pay attention to subsequent compe-
tence information was reduced and that subsequent
morality information would have received more atten-
tion. Future research should decide on this matter. In
the meantime, it is interesting to note that these findings
are at odds with the idea that after negative morality
information, people will look for competence informa-
tion because of its diagnosticity in deciding whether an
immoral person is capable of fulfilling immoral inten-
tions (Wojciszke et al., 1998). In contrast, the strong
impact of negative morality information decreases moti-
vation to pay attention to subsequent competence
information.
Perceiver Influences:
Social Value Orientation
The third purpose of the present research was to
investigate the influence of individual differences in
social value orientation on information search and
attention. In Study 1, consistent with the social-value-
orientation hypothesis, more proselfs than prosocials
requested additional competence information after
morality information.
Furthermore, as we have seen in Study 2, perceivers’
social value orientations strongly affect impressions.
First, for prosocials, competence information does not
affect impressions, whereas it does for proselfs—albeit
only when the morality information was positive. Sec-
ond, for prosocials, morality information affects impres-
sions regardless of the valence of the competence infor-
mation, whereas for proselfs, morality only affects
impressions when competence information is positive.
This latter result is in line with the idea that it is useful
to give weight to morality information (i.e., information
about good or bad interpersonal intentions) only when a
person is competent (i.e., capable to act on those inten-
tions) (cf. Wojciszke et al., 1998). It is also congruent
with studies showing that in the competence domain, a
positivity effect is more likely than a negativity effect
(Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Reeder & Fulks, 1980; Reeder,
Pryor, & Wojciszke, 1992; Skowronski & Carlston, 1989).
We found that this effect was only significant for proselfs.
An interesting possibility is that generally, positivity
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effects for competence information will be stronger for
proselfs than for prosocials because prosocials will always
pay more attention to morality information (if available)
rather than competence information. If this would be
the case, it may partially explain why positivity effects for
competence information are so much harder to demon-
strate than negativity effects for morality information
(cf. Peeters & Czapinski, 1990).
The differences between prosocials and proselfs may
be interpreted in terms of chronically accessible con-
structs (Bargh & Thein, 1985; cf. Bargh & Pratto, 1986;
Higgins & King, 1981) or information processing effi-
ciency (cf. Smith, Branscombe, & Bormann, 1988;
Smith & Lerner, 1986). Previous research demonstrat-
ing perceptual differences between prosocials and
proselfs—that is, the former interpreting situations in
terms of morality, the latter in terms of competence
(e.g., Kuhlman, Brown, & Teta, 1992; Liebrand et al.,
1986; Sattler & Kerr, 1991; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994;
Van Lange & Liebrand, 1991b)—suggests that morality
may be a chronically accessible construct for prosocials
and that competence may be a chronically accessible
construct for proselfs (see also Van Lange & Kuhlman,
1994).
How might prosocials come to be more schematic for
morality-information than proselfs? Our suggestion
would be that people’s interaction goals determine the
way people process information about others (cf. Hil-
ton & Darley, 1991). Prosocials tend to pursue coopera-
tive goals only when they expect the other person also to
be cooperative (e.g., Kelley & Stahelski, 1970). There-
fore, morality information, which is so directly linked to
cooperation (e.g., De Bruin & Van Lange, 1999a,
1999b), is of paramount importance to prosocials’ deci-
sions whether to cooperate. In contrast, proselfs tend to
be noncooperative, irrespective of what they expect the
other person to do. Following this line of reasoning, pro-
socials, more than proselfs, would develop experience
with perceptions based on morality categories.
It is interesting to speculate about possible conse-
quences of these perceptual and attentional differences
between prosocials and proselfs in everyday life. One can
easily imagine situations in which such differences lead
to communication problems, prosocials talking about
morality aspects of a person and proselfs stressing com-
petence. As it is oftentimes the case that our impressions
of others are, in part, communicated to us by others, the
social value orientation of the messenger can be
expected to influence our resulting impression. This
would be an interesting topic for future research.
Strengths and Limitations
We would like to close by pointing out some of the
strengths and limitations of the present research. To
begin with, these studies are among the first to investi-
gate both perceiver influences on impression formation
and information selection and to study these processes
in an interaction context. This is a clear step forward
from classical impression formation studies in which all
perceivers are thought similar to one-way-mirror observ-
ers who passively use all of the incoming information
provided by the experimenter. Another strength of the
current research is that we investigated both active (i.e.,
information search) and passive (i.e., selective attention
and weight) aspects of information processing in
impression formation. Interestingly, these aspects did
not necessarily produce similar results. For example,
although we found that attention and weight assigned to
competence information decreased more after negative
than after positive morality information, negative moral-
ity information did not similarly decrease people’s moti-
vation to actively search for additional information.
Active information search and more passive attention to
incoming information may thus be guided by different
specific cognitive processes.
Clearly, the current research also has its limitations.
First, one may regard it as a limitation that the interac-
tion context we employed can be characterized as over-
simplified, not involving real interaction. However, we
contend that such a situation, stripped of all possible
confounding factors associated with real life interaction,
addresses basic human motivations—and those, after all,
are what we are currently interested in. Obviously, more
research is needed to investigate more complex situa-
tions, but at present, a social dilemma task serves as an
appropriate research tool for studying rather elemental
impression-formation processes. Second, one may
regard it as a limitation that we used relatively short and
abstract person information rather than more realistic
behavioral descriptions. At the same time, we have seen
that these very simple descriptions elicit meaningful dif-
ferences in search and attention processes and impres-
sions. Similarly, then, such stripped descriptions may
teach us about the very basic processes underlying per-
son perception.
Finally, a very common limitation is that our partici-
pants were all college students. However, in the present
research, this limitation is a relevant one. Because the
proportion of prosocials has been found to increase with
age (cf. prosocial-growth hypothesis) (Van Lange et al.,
1997), morality categories will be increasingly important
for older people. Given that undergraduate students are
relatively young, the general impact of especially nega-
tive morality information on person impressions may be
even more pronounced than depicted in the present
research. The implication—both descriptive and nor-
mative—is that people should refrain from displaying
immoral behaviors at any time if they do not want other
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people’s impressions of them spoiled: Once a thief,
always a thief.
APPENDIX
The Personality Test Excerpts Used in the Two Studies
Moral Information
X is a considerate person, somebody who is always ready to
help other people. X is interested in other people. I think that
people are gladly and often inclined to appeal to X. And rightly
so: X is preeminently helpful. Also, X is a very moral person.
One can really rely on X.
Immoral Information
X is not a very considerate person, not really somebody who
is always ready to help other people. X is not very interested in
other people. I do not think that people are gladly or often in-
clined to appeal to X. And rightly so: X happens not to be help-
ful. Also, X is a fairly immoral person. One cannot really rely
on X.
Competent Information (Study 1)
X is very competent. X always knows exactly how things
work. And if someone explains something, X immediately
grasps it. Apparently, X stores information in a very efficient
way. Also, X is very capable in deducing how certain knowledge
is best applied. X is a very intelligent person who quickly under-
stands things.
Incompetent Information (Study 1)
X is not very competent. X never knows exactly how things
work. And if someone explains something, it takes a long time
before X grasps it. Apparently, X stores information in a very in-
efficient way. Also, X is not very capable in deducing how cer-
tain knowledge is best applied. X is a rather unintelligent
person who does not quickly understand things.
Competent Information (Study 2)
X is very competent. X always knows exactly how things
work. And if someone explains something, X immediately
grasps it. X is very capable in decision making. Also, X can over-
look the consequences of decisions very well. X is a very intelli-
gent person who quickly understands things.
Incompetent Information (Study 2)
X is not very competent. X never knows exactly how things
work. And if someone explains something, it takes a long time
before X grasps it. X is not very capable in decision making.
Also, X cannot overlook the consequences of decisions very
well. X is a rather unintelligent person who does not quickly un-
derstand things.
NOTES
1. Preliminary analyses showed no effects involving participant’s
gender; therefore, this variable will not be further discussed.
2. Preliminary analyses showed no effects involving participant’s
gender; therefore, this variable will not be further discussed.
3. Participants were given one of three instructional sets in which
(a) they were told that they should use the information to predict how
many points the other person would give to them, (b) they were told
that they should use the information to decide how many points they
would give to the other person, or (c) the use of the information was
not specified. Instructional set did not produce any systematic effects
and it will not be further discussed.
4. As noted before, in these two studies, we focused on the way
search and attention processes affected impression formation; our
focus was not on the ways in which behavioral measures, such as
expected and own cooperation, were affected by differential search
and attention. These measures appeared to be influenced only by
valence of morality information (i.e., more cooperation expected
from and displayed by prosocials vs. proselfs). However, we did not
obtain interactions of social value orientation with valence of morality
information on the measures. In retrospect, this may not be surprising
because there are several mechanisms that may influence these mea-
sures (cf. Yamagishi & Sato, 1986). For example, measures of expected
cooperation may be influenced by self-justification or anticipated
behavior, projection, or similarity judgments. In comparison, impres-
sions provide a more clean measure, which is why we decided to use
these as a starting point. For the way in which characteristics of the
other person influence cooperative behavior, we refer the reader to De
Bruin and Van Lange (1999a, 1999b).
5. The dimension main effect also was qualified by an unpredicted
interaction of dimension by social value orientation, F(1, 88) = 8.40, p <
.01. Both prosocials (M = 18.47 vs. M = 15.24 seconds) and proselfs (M =
21.34 vs. M = 13.72 seconds) spent more time reading morality infor-
mation than competence information, but for proselfs, this difference
was more pronounced than for prosocials (mean differences of 7.62
and 3.23 seconds, respectively).
6. The analysis also produced a main effect for social value orienta-
tion, F(1, 93) = 7.51, p < .008. However, we do not consider this effect
substantially meaningful because (a) this effect was not predicted and
(b) differences in means for prosocials versus proselfs were very small
(Ms = 0.00 vs. –0.02).
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